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RESPONSE TO ELAINE JENKINS 5 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the alleged Statement of Facts in the Brief of Elaine Jenkins may
represent the testimony of Ms. Jenkins, they are really not relevant to the issues on
appeal. However, Alan Jenkins believes that certain of the "facts" set forth in Ms.
Jenkins' Brief, misrepresent the evidence and should be addressed.
Brief of Appellee, p. 1: 1. Elaine Jenkins was raised in an economic system under
which all "income" and "property" of the members were held "in common" (the
"Order")
Ms. Jenkins herself testified that the property and units "she owned" was her
own, to spend or use as she pleased, and was recognized as her own by the
cooperative. (Brief of Appellee, p. 2, paragraphs 4-5; brief of Appellee, p. 6,
paragraph 28).

The other members of the Davis County Co-operative, and even

the ex-members, testified that the property listed on their inventories was property
owned by the member, not the co-operative. (R. at 385, p. 165, 171, 177, 189, 376;
386, pp 430-431). There was no evidence that any property was held "in common"
by the members of the co-operative, or by the co-operative itself.
Brief of Appellee, p. 4: 18. When members of the Order purchased a home, they
were "expected to turn the title [to Home] over to [the Order] and allow [the
Order] to put title in the name of one of their entities.
Contrary to the testimony of some ex-members of the cooperative called by
Elaine Jenkins, none of whom produced any documentation evidencing how title to
the real property was held, each of the witnesses called by Alan Jenkins testified
that their homes were titled in their own names, some going clear back to 1963.
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They produced the recorded documents to prove that the homes were titled in the
names of the owners^ not in the name of the cooperative, or an entity affiliated with
the cooperative. These witnesses were not selected because their homes were in
their names. They were the individuals who dealt with Elaine Jenkins, D. U. Co.,
Davis County Co-operative, were familiar with the issues in the case and
represented typical cooperative members.
Verl Johnson, president of D. U. Company, testified (R. at 385, pp. 218-219),
Q. By Mr. Kingston: I show you what has been marked as Defendant's
Exhibit 13. Can you identify that document?
A. It's the deed to my home.
Q. And it lists you as the owner?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. And it does have the recording information in the top right-hand corner;
does it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that property ever in the name of DU Company?
A. No.
Q. Anybody else's name other than the entity that you acquired it from?
A. No.
Q. The entity that is listed as the grantor when you purchased the property
Was Earning Services Corporation.
A. Yes.
Q. To your knowledge, does anyone in that company have any connection at
all with Davis County Cooperative?
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A. No.
Q. Are the officers or directors of that company members of the
cooperative?
A. No.
Alan Jenkins, the appellant, testified (R. at 385, pp. 254-255),
Q. Okay, I'm going to show you what has been marked as Defendant's
Exhibit D-20. Can you identify that document?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. What is it?
A. This is a deed to my house.
Q. Whose name is that house in?
A. Alan Jenkins, 6227 South 300 East, Murray, Utah.
Q. Has it always been in your name since that date?
A. It has.
Q. Did anyone ever tell you you had to put that into somebody else's name
or some company's name?
A. Never.
Q. Have you ever understood it to be a tenant {sic, should be "tenet") or a
belief or an obligation that a member of the cooperative to put their property
into somebody else's name?
A. No.
Alanna {sic, should be "Ilona") Kingston, the secretary of the Davis County
Cooperative, testified (R. at 385, pp. 344-345),
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Q. Have you ever heard of a tenant (sic, should be "tenet") or a teaching of
the cooperative that says if a member buys real property, it can't be put into
their own name?
A. No.
Q. Do you own any real property?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What property do you own?
A. Are you talking about real property?
Q. Real property.
A. My home at 1798 South 9th East.
Q. Who is the record owner of that home?
A. lam.
Q. How long have you owned that?
A. Well, I've actually owned it since '63, but I think we registered it in the
'80's.
Q. Why did you wait so long to register it?
A. I just didn't realize that it had to be registered.
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 34.
Can you identify that document?
A. Yes, it's a deed.
Q. What is it?
A. It's a deed for my home.
Q. And does it show you as the owner of the home?
A. Yes, it does.
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Q. It shows I. G. Kingston; is that you?
A. That's me, uh-huh.
Q. Who owned the home before you did?
A. My grandmother.
Q. Was she a member of the Davis County Cooperative Society?
A. Yes, she was.
Q. Was the property in her name before she deeded it to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was she a good member?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you a good member?
A. I hope so.
Q. Did anybody ever tell you you had to put that property into somebody
else's name?
A. No.
Q. So that's been done clear since 1963?
A. Right.
Elaine Crossley, the former secretary of D. U. Company, testified (R. at 386,
pp. 415-416),
Q. Do you own your own home?
A. Yes.
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Q. I show you what's been marked as Defendant's 42. Can you tell me
what that document is?
A. It's the warranty deed that MSE granted to myself.
Q. It says to B. E. Crossley. Is that you?
A. Yes.
Q. What does "B" stand for?
A. Bonnie.
Q. And"E"?
A. Elaine.
Q. So that is the deed to your property. Is that where you live?
A. Yes.
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that as a member of the cooperative, that
property should be placed in somebody else's name or some business'
name?
A. No.
Francis Mark Hansen, the attorney that represented Elaine Jenkins' exhusband, Sam Jenkins, in their divorce action, testified (R. at 386, pp. 428-430),
Q. Do you own the home where you live?
A. I do.
Q. Whose name is that home in?
A. It's in the name of myself and my wife.
Q. I show you Defendant's Exhibit 45.
please?
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Can you identify that document,

A. Yes, that is the Warranty Deed to my home. I copied it this morning
from the original.

Q. By Mr. Cline {sic, should be "Kingston"): And what's the date of that
document?
A. It is November 17 , 1989, the date we purchased the home. We actually
moved in on December 1st of that year.
Q. Has it always been in your name since that date?
A. It has always been in the name of - in fact, there has been no change to
the warranty deed.
Q. And it said it's in the name of F. Mark Hansen and Suzanne Hansen as
well?
A. As tenants in the entirety, yes.
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that as a member of the cooperative, it was
required that you put that property in somebody else's name, or some other
business' name?
A. No, and in fact, when we first purchased the property, the lender was
Fidelity Funding Company. That's a company that was managed by Rachel
Young, who was also a member of Davis County Cooperative Society, and
they made the loan with full knowledge of the way this warranty deed was
prepared.
Q. Didn't have any problem with that?
A. No problem at all.
Brief of Appellee, p. 4: Each year, the Davis County Cooperative Society gave
each member of the Order an ^inventory" that listed all property owned by the
member.
Although "inventories" were typed by the cooperative and given to the
members, each person who testified regarding the preparation of the inventories,
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including Elaine Jenkins, testified that the list of property on a member's inventory
sheet, and the value placed on the property, was prepared by the member, not by the
cooperative.
Elaine Jenkins testified that she and/or Sam, her ex-husband provided the
information for the inventories, including the property listed and its value (R. at
384, p. 95). Ms. Jenkins' own witnesses verified that each member would provide
the list of property and the values that would be on their inventories. Mr. Peterson
testified (R. at 385, p. 181),
Q. .. .do you know who submits that information, [on the inventories].. .?
A. The different people. They can fill out the papers that they - before the
end of the year; and then they submit them to Alana or different people.
Then they take and they put them on paper, and then they give them to you
in January.
Q. Okay. So the information that would be on the top of the exhibit that
you've looked at, it's your understanding that that information was provided
by Sam and Elaine Jenkins?
A. Yeah.
Ilona Kingston, the secretary of Davis County Cooperative Society, testified
that each member prepares his or her own inventory and lists what property he or
she believes should be listed, along with a value they want to put on the property.
The cooperative doesn't care what the member lists, what value is placed on the
property and never checks the list for accuracy or errors. (R. at 385, pp. 356-357).
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Francis Mark Hansen testified that a member can put anything on his inventory that
he wants to and put any valuation on his property that he wants, and no one ever
questions it. (R. at 386, p. 431)
ARGUMENT
1. THE DENIAL OF ALAN JENKINS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS APPEALABLE.
Elaine Jenkins cites the case of Normandeau vs. Hanson Equipment, Inc.
174 P3d 1 (Utah App. 2007) in support of her argument that the denial of Alan
Jenkins' motion for summary judgment is not appealable. However, the court in
Normandeau said at §13
Utah case law suggests that we will entertain an appeal of a denial of a
motion for summary judgment only if it involves a legal issue. In Estate
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone
& Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
reviewed a denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits because
the trial court "was dealing with undisputed facts, [and its] denial of
summary judgment amounted to a ruling of law."
Alan Jenkins' motion for summary judgment was based upon two legal
theories, to wit, the statute of frauds and judicial estoppal. The facts supporting Mr.
Jenkins' motion, as set forth in the motion and in Appellant's Brief, were not
disputed at the trial level and they are not disputed in Elaine Jenkins' Brief of
Appellee. The trial court's denial of the motion was clearly a ruling of law, subject
to review by this Court.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A, Elaine Jenkins5 Claims are Barred by the Statute of Frauds,
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Elaine Jenkins argues that the trial court correctly denied Alan Jenkins's
motion, because her affidavit alleging that she and Sam Jenkins purchased the
property and that D. U. Company held the property for the benefit of her and Sam,
created an issue of fact, whether or not there was an oral agreement that was
disputed.
As discussed in Alan Jenkins' Appellant's brief, Elaine Jenkins' affidavit
did not meet the criteria needed in order to take the issue out of the statute of
frauds. She did not show that there was any agreement, written or oral, with
anyone, that she was the owner of the home, or that D. U. Company, or anyone else
agreed that it was hers, or if there were an agreement, what the agreement required
her to do in order to acquire title to the home. The case of Ravarino v. Price, 123
Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953), ruled that a statement made by the claimant to
property, of full or partial performance, is not sufficient to create an exception to
the statute of frauds, unless the claimant's actions "establish by clear and positive
proof, acts and things done in pursuance and on account thereof, exclusively
referable thereto". Ms. Jenkins' acts demonstrated nothing more than that she was
a tenant of the property.
B. Elaine Jenkins' Claims are Barred by the Doctrine of Judicial
Estoppal.
Even if the court were to find that there was a disputed issue of fact as to the
statute of frauds argument, there was no disputed issue of fact regarding Alan
Jenkins' judicial estoppal argument. In the previous divorce action, Elaine Jenkins
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and her ex-husband Sam, both represented to the court, to their attorneys, to each
other and to everyone else who may have relied upon those representations, that
they neither owned nor had acquired any interest in the real property at issue in this
case. Elaine Jenkins argues that she didn't really mean what she said and that her
attorney in the previous legal action misled her and told her that even though she
said she had no interest in the subject property, she could change her story later and
claim ownership in a subsequent legal action. Even if that were true, her subjective
intent is not material. Under the controlling case law, what she did and what she
agreed to are what matters. In Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neweys, Inc., 16 P.3d
1214, 410 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 2000 UT 93, Macris argued that he didn't really
intend that by signing a stipulation settling his claims against Neweys, he would be
barred from raising claims that arose out of the transaction after the date of the
stipulation. The Court in Macris said,
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in a former action is applicable to all
matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. . . It
follows, therefore, that a party cannot by negligence or design withhold
issues and litigate them in separate actions.
If the law is, as stated in Macris, that one cannot withhold an issue that
should have been litigated in a previous action, and then litigate it in a subsequent
action, it certainly follows that if the very issue is litigated and ruled upon in a
previous action, that issue cannot be relitigated in a subsequent action.

The

ownership of real property was at issue in Ms. Jenkins' previous divorce action, it
was litigated in that action and it was ruled upon. Ms. Jenkins, in the previous
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action, said she did not own the property at issue in this case and she cannot in this
subsequent action, relitigate that very same issue.
Elaine Jenkins argues that judicial estoppal does not apply in this case,
because there is "no identity of issues" and the issue of ownership was "not
competently, fully and fairly litigated". Again, Macris is determinative on these
issues.
(i) The issue is the same. The issue in the prior litigation was, what real
property did Elaine and Sam Jenkins own or have an interest in. The issue in the
present litigation, is whether or not Elaine Jenkins owns or has an interest in the
real property at 1074 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, Utah.

Elaine

Jenkins argues that since she now claims that D. U. Company held the subject
property in trust for her, the issue of whether or not she had an interest in the
property is not the same as whether or not she and Sam owned or had an interest in
the property at the time of their divorce. Whether property is owned in fee title, or
as a beneficiary of some kind of trust, it is still an "interest" in the property. In the
present case, Elaine Jenkins testified throughout the trial that she owned the
property from the time D. U. Company purchased it from Mr. Berg. That is directly
contrary to what she said and did in the prior divorce action. In the prior litigation,
both Elaine Jenkins and Sam Jenkins declared that they had "acquired no other real
property during the course of the marriage", except for the real property in Rupert,
Idaho. Even if there could be a distinction between fee ownership and owning a
beneficial interest in some kind of trust arrangement, whether or not Sam and
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Elaine had an interest in the real property at 1074 North Redwood Road, was
certainly a "matter essentially connected with the litigation" in the divorce action,
as described in Macris.
Elaine Jenkins argues that to hold that she is now barred from asserting a
claim to the real property, because she failed to list the property in the divorce
action, would lead to the absurd result that where parties to a divorce proceeding
fail to list all of the real property that they own, that would cause their ownership
interest in the property to disappear, and a third party would reap a windfall. That
simply is not so. The ownership of, or interests in real property, is governed by
statute. Such interests, with strict exceptions, must be evidenced by documents
properly recorded in the county where the property is located. If the record title
evidences an interest of a person involved in a divorce proceeding, the failure to list
the property will not change the record, or result in an extinguishment of the
interest. However, because there are laws that govern real property ownership,
transfers, liens and other interests therein, a party claiming an interest in or to real
property is bound by those laws. An oversight in not listing certain real or personal
property in a divorce action, is far different from what we have in this case. It was
not a case of simply not listing the property, it was a case where Ms. Jenkins and
her ex husband both declared that they did not own any real property, except for
that in Idaho. It was not something she overlooked, or forgot about. She was living
in the subject property at the time of the divorce with her children. She even admits
that she discussed her interest in the property that she now claims she has owned
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since 1986 with her divorce attorney before she signed the Stipulation in 1997 that
said she had no interest in it.
(ii) The issue was competently, fully and fairly litigated.

Elaine Jenkins

argues that the issue of ownership of the subject property was not fully and fairly
litigated, because the stipulation she signed did not manifest an intent that she be
bound by the stipulation in a subsequent action. However, it could not have been
made more clear, that her intent in signing the stipulation was to declare that she
owned no interest in any real property, other than the property in Rupert, Idaho. It
would be contrary to law and to the holding in Macris, to rule that a statement in a
stipulation filed with a court will only be binding on the party signing the
stipulation in future litigation, if that party includes a phrase in the stipulation that
she intends the statement to also be binding upon her in subsequent litigation. As
the Court in Macris said,
. . .if the stipulation is meant to be final as to some damages but not final as
to other damages, it must say so. Our review of the record in this case,
however, evidences no such intention. Moreover, the trial court made no
finding that its damages award - which was based upon the stipulation - was
not final as to all damages. Therefore, we find that the stipulation in this
case has res judicata effect.
As in the Macris case, there was nothing in the stipulation, findings of fact,
conclusions of law, or decree of divorce in the Jenkins divorce that indicated any
intent on the part of the trial court to limit the ruling that neither Sam nor Elaine
Jenkins owned any real property except for that in Rupert, Idaho.

Where a

statement of fact in a stipulation is as simple as "she does or she doesn't" own real
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property, that alone is sufficient evidence that the party intends to be bound by the
stipulation and that the issue is foreclosed in other litigation.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS' MOTION
TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO INCLUDE THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS DEFENSE.
The trial court ostensibly gave three reasons for denying the motion of Alan
Jenkins to amend his answer to include an additional defense of the statute of
limitations: (1) The Motion was not timely; (2) No good reason was given why the
Motion was untimely; and (3) The plaintiff would be prejudiced. However, the
record does not support any of the reasons given. The validity of the proposed
affirmative defense depended upon the date Elaine Jenkins' cause of action arose
and when she knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of
action. Alan Jenkins' Motion to Amend was filed more than ninety days prior to
the date set for trial. Ninety days was ample time for Elaine Jenkins to prepare to
meet the defense, particularly where no additional discovery would be needed. The
case law regarding when an answer may be amended, is particularly liberal, when
the proposed amendment raises an affirmative defense. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah
2d 205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm. 570 P.2d 690 (Utah
1976). The motion, filed ninety days before trial, was timely.
The primary reason given by Alan Jenkins for the motion, as acknowledged
by the trial judge, was newly discovered evidence, learned by Alan Jenkins during
discovery in preparation for trial, through the interview of witnesses familiar with
the events. The trial judge acknowledged this reason when he commented at the
15

hearing, "Apparently you have become aware of this as a result of information that
has come to your attention". There was no claim that Alan Jenkins knew or should
have known of the facts raising the issue of the statute of limitations being a viable
defense before he learned of those facts through trial preparation. A justifiable
reason was given for the delay in raising the additional defense. Rule 15 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that leave to amend should be freely given
when justice so requires. To deny Alan Jenkins the affirmative defense of the
statute of limitations, codified in §§78-12-25 and 78-12-26, effectively denied him
justice in this case.
Although the trial court declared that the plaintiff would be prejudiced
because she may have to undertake additional discovery to prepare to meet the
additional defense, there was no suggestion, either by the Court or by Elaine
Jenkins, identifying the nature of any additional discovery that would be required.
It is clear that no additional discovery would have been required. The timing of the
events were well settled, the facts of events regarding Elaine Jenkins knowledge
were not disputed, and nothing either party could have discovered would have
changed the facts, the timing of the events, or Elaine Jenkins knowledge of those
events. There simply was no showing of any prejudice Elaine Jenkins would have
suffered had the Alan Jenkins' motion to amend been granted. This is particularly
true where neither Elaine Jenkins nor the Court identified any additional discovery
that would be needed to meet the additional affirmative defense.
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4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS9
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Elaine Jenkins argues that Alan Jenkins failed to adequately brief this issue.
However, Mr. Jenkins' brief contains excerpts from and references to the testimony
given at trial related to each requested instruction and explains why the issues
covered by the proposed instructions were properly before the court and jury. Each
of the proposed instructions which was not given is included in full, in Addendum
13 to Mr. Jenkins' brief, with the statutory and/or case law authority shown on each
page of the proposed instruction^ as evidence that the proposed instruction is
supported by statute and/or case law.
CONCLUSION - RELIEF SOUGHT
As requested in Mr. Jenkins' Appellant Brief, he requests that the trial
court's decision be reversed and judgment awarded to him, declaring him to be the
owner of the subject property, free and clear of any claims of Elaine Jenkins and
her children, and that he be awarded damages as prayed in his complaint. In the
alternative he requests that the case be remanded for a new trial.
Dated this

Y

day of August, 2008.

<T &

?*--

y
Carl E. Kingston
Attorney for Appellant Alan Jenkins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

V

day of August, 2008, two true and correct

copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant were sent via U. S. mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Russell A. Cline, Esq.
Crippen & Cline, L.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Carl E. Kingston
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